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TAGS: [PGOV](#) [PREL](#) [UNSC](#) [UNMIK](#) [YI](#)
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR WISNER'S MEETING WITH UNMIK SRSG SOREN
JESSEN-PETERSEN

Classified By: Acting Political Counselor Molly Phee, Reasons 1.4 (b) a
nd (d).

¶1. (C) During a May 19 meeting at the Brook Club in New York, Ambassador Wisner and UNMIK SRSG Soren Jessen-Petersen discussed recent developments in the Kosovo status process and progress towards standards implementation. (Note: As the Brook Club does not allow note taking on its premises, this telegram was drafted only to provide a sense of the meeting. End note.) Ambassador Wisner began the meeting by handing Jessen-Petersen a copy of a letter to Secretary Rice signed by Prime Minister Kostunica and President Tadic that criticized the current status talks. Wisner called the letter, and the way it was delivered, "a crude but nasty dilatory tactic to try to isolate Special Envoy Ahtisaari." Jessen-Petersen concurred with that assessment, noting he had just come from Washington where he heard concerns regarding weakening European resolve to deal firmly with Belgrade. Jessen-Petersen stated that he shared those concerns about a rising European chorus of anxiety arguing for more attention to the fragility of democracy in Belgrade. He also agreed about the lack of "available levers" at the moment, especially since EU accession talks were on hold and NATO PFP was also off the table without Mladic in the Hague. Jessen-Petersen assessed that this weakening European resolve and the challenge it presented for managing Belgrade's cooperation with the status process was surmountable, but argued that a display of strong US commitment would be essential.

¶2. (C) Turning to the issue of standards implementation in Kosovo, Jessen-Petersen said overall developments were moving along well in Kosovo with Prime Minister Ceku at the helm steering reforms. Jessen-Petersen's recently completed -- but not yet officially released -- assessment was positive in tone overall because Ceku had accomplished much in the last few months. Jessen-Petersen handed Wisner a list of thirteen further reforms he thought were needed in the coming months as well as a "U.S. Non-paper" that analyzed the list of recommendations and pointed out which of them were the most feasible and necessary. Jessen-Petersen said "because of the strong stance Belgrade is taking it is all the more necessary for the Kosovar Albanians to go the extra mile, even the extra two miles." "I delivered this message in Pristina this week telling the Kosovar Albanian leadership that when they meet with Rohan they will need to seem ready to offer more and that it will be very problematic if they do not," Jessen-Petersen continued. "The problem is with the unity team," Jessen-Petersen asserted, "because each member does not want show all of his cards."

¶3. (C) Raising the problem of North Mitrovica, Wisner asked Jessen-Petersen how he thought it ought to be handled. Jessen-Petersen said he wanted to take a number of steps including: 1) creating a more robust security presence in the form of KFOR, increased UN police (which was already being implemented as 40 officers had been transferred to North Mitrovica recently) and the Kosovo Protection Corps; 2) a better communications approach to counter Belgrade's propaganda ; 3) and immediate efforts to fund and implement quick projects that could be put into place now (e.g., building a small community center, etc.) and that would also disprove Belgrade's propaganda. Wisner said he saw Belgrade's manipulation of salaries as a potentially serious problem because it might precipitate Serb departures from Kosovo by the end of the year. Jessen-Petersen agreed, saying there were even signs that exodus could start this summer. Jessen-Petersen noted that Ceku's policy of keeping the salaries in escrow was a wise move.

¶4. (C) Continuing their discussion on North Mitrovica, Wisner asked Jessen-Petersen how he envisioned dealing with the problem. Jessen-Petersen replied that he hoped for an arrangement that would employ the best points of Eastern Slavonia in Croatia as well as some of Brcko in Bosnia. Responding to a further clarifying question from Wisner, Jessen-Petersen said Mitrovica would need an international administrator for some time, but that person's powers should not go beyond those of the international representative in Pristina. The Pristina international representative would not be a double-hatted UN official, but an EU representative; he foresaw following a model similar to the Office of the High Representative in Bosnia, where the representative is sent from the EU but reports to the Security Council several times a year because the position would be created by a UNSC mandate.

¶5. (C) Bringing the meeting to a close, Ambassador Wisner noted that he would reinforce Jessen-Petersen's message to the Kosovar Albanian leadership that strong action was needed during his visit to Pristina over the weekend. Wisner promised to draw on the points that Jessen-Petersen had given him.
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